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ABSTRACT 
The Impact of fiscal support on earnings management：  
Evidence from equity offerings in China 
 
By 
 
HE Guanming 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
It is well documented in existing literature that firms manipulate earnings before 
IPOs (initial public offerings) and SEOs (seasoned equity offerings). This study 
contributes to prior research by being the first to examine whether fiscal support 
from local governments has impact on the earnings management behavior of Chinese 
listed firms. Using data from firms that conduct IPOs and SEOs from 1997 to 2006, I 
find that firms are less likely to manipulate earnings prior to the offerings if they 
enjoy more income tax savings attributed to the preferential tax favor or more 
financial subsidy from the local governments.  
 
The findings of the study have important policy implications. Noticeably, the new 
Enterprise Income Tax Law effective from 1 January, 2008 abrogates the original tax 
system that allows various preferential tax rates for firms of different properties and 
stipulates a 25% enterprise income tax rate for all firms in China. Given the 
abolishment of the preferential tax favor, local governments lose a potent avenue of 
lending fiscal support to the listed firms. To this end, based on the findings in this 
study, I expect that the opportunistic earnings management by listed firms will 
probably be aggravated after the new income tax law is duly enforced.  
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1  Introduction 
Officially opened in the early 1990s, China’s stock exchanges were established 
as an experiment in combining a market economy with central planning. As most 
listed companies are sponsored and controlled by government-related entities, 
governmental intervention has dominated throughout. The quotas of IPOs distributed 
from the state are allocated by the local governments to firms selected from their 
jurisdictions. The local governments deemed the listed firms within its jurisdiction as 
a symbol of wealth and prestige as well as a potent tool to absorb capital and 
technology which are essential for the promotion of a region’s GDP growth (Chan et 
al., 2006). The equity offering has been a crucial financing channel not only for listed 
firms but also for the local governments for promoting their territorial economic 
growth. However, the regulations require the listed firms to attain a minimum return 
on equity (ROE) to be qualified for the rights offerings. The presumption that earning 
is a premier source of firm-specific information is well supported by research 
literature (Biddle et al. 1995; Francis et al. 2003; Liu et al. 2002; Graham et al. 2005). 
These studies show that investors as well as analysts rely on earnings more than any 
other summary measure of performance. Therefore, both the local governments and 
their listed firms collectively have strong motivation to boost the reported earnings 
prior to the equity offerings. On one hand, to promote territorial economy, local 
governments compete to lend fiscal support (preferential tax treatment and financial 
subsidy) to the listed firms within their regions (Chen and Lee, 2001)1, engendering 
the drastic tax competition among the local governments. On the other hand, the 
listed firms in pursuit of low financing costs are inclined to manipulate earnings to a 
                                                        
1 Chen and Lee (2001) conduct descriptive statistic test on the fiscal support for Chinese listed firms during test 
period of 1997-1999, and show that, in order to compete for capital investment in the stock market, the local 
governments generally provide tax favor and financial subsidy to the listed firms located in their jurisdictions.  
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high level.  
The thesis contributes to the existing literature by being the first to investigate 
whether the fiscal supports from local governments exert impact on earnings 
management in Chinese listed firms. Different from earnings manipulations by firms, 
fiscal support in the form of financial subsidy and preferential tax favor that are 
granted by the local governments adds substantial economic value to the listed firms 
without prospective reversal of earnings performance. Prior research (e.g. 
Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1988; Teoh and Wong, 1993; Jian and Wong, 2004; Haw 
et al., 2005) well documents that investors would place less value on the earnings 
that are suspected of manipulation by a firm and discount the share prices of the firm. 
In this vein, I hypothesize that a firm will be less likely to take risks in earnings 
manipulations prior to the equity issues if the firm is fiscally supported by the local 
government in boosting the reported earnings. 
Earnings manipulations using discretionary accruals are difficult to detect and the 
enforcing authority may not be capable of making the necessary adjustments due to 
the high processing costs to undo earnings management through discretionary 
accruals (Cahan, 1992; Schipper, 1989). Chinese listed companies mainly engage in 
accruals to manipulate earnings (Chen et al., 2006; Jian et al., 2004; Aharony et al., 
2000). So in this study, earnings management is proxied by discretionary accruals. I 
test the hypothesis by analyzing the sample firm-years three years prior to the 
offerings by both IPO firms (firms that have initial public offerings) and SEO firms 
(firms that conduct seasoned equity offerings) from 1997 to 2006. I find that firms 
will be less likely to manipulate earnings prior to the equity issues if they enjoy more 
income tax savings attributed to the preferential tax favor or more financial subsidy 
from the local governments. The findings of this study complement to prior research 
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on equity offerings and suggest that institutional factors of fiscal supports that 
incarnate the political incentives of local governments should be accounted for in 
earnings management research on China’s or other East Asian emerging markets (e.g. 
India, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc) in which fiscal support from local government 
prevails and government intervention into firm’s reporting practices predominates 
(e.g. Leuz and Oberholzer, 2007; Piotroski et al., 2007; Guly, 2006; Bushman et al., 
2004). Given privatization through the sale of state-owned enterprise (SOEs) by the 
government and the increased opportunities for investors to purchase shares in 
China’s market2, understanding the impact of fiscal support with political incentives 
on the underlying financial reporting environment and financial reporting incentives 
of firms is important for market participants in their investment decisions. 
  My study has implication for the economic influence of the enforcement of the 
Enterprise Income Tax Law of PRC in 2008 on the capital market. The new 
Enterprise Income Tax Law promulgated in March 2007 abrogates the original tax 
system that allows varied tax rates applicable for firms of different properties, and 
stipulates a 25% enterprise income tax rate applied to all Chinese firms. Given the 
ultimate abolishment of the preferential tax favor with a few exceptions after the 
transitional period, local governments will lose a potent avenue of lending fiscal 
support to the listed firms. To this end, basing on the findings in this study, I expect 
that opportunistic earnings management by listed firms will probably be aggravated 
after the new income tax act is duly enforced at the beginning of 2008.  
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the 
institutional background and develops the research hypothesis. Section 3 expatiates 
                                                        
2 Many transitional economies such as China, India, Vietnam are privatizing their SOEs through either selling 
state shares in domestic market or listing in developed overseas markets. In recent years, the capital raising 
activities of SOEs have triggered fierce competition among global stock exchanges to seek new listings from 
Chinese firms (Kissel and Santini, 2004), notably for the world’s biggest IPO by Industrial & Commercial Bank 
of China Ltd. (ICBC)’s $19 billion share issuance.   
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on the research design which is followed by discussions of the empirical tests in 
section 4. Section 5 checks the robustness of the results and section 6 concludes. 
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2  Institutional Background and Research Hypothesis 
2.1. China’s tax regime and fiscal support from local governments 
In China, the central government implements a planned quota system for IPOs 
under which a limited listing quota is assigned to the planning commission at 
province level, and then it makes the allocation to IPO candidates within its 
administrative region. The limited share quota assigned to each firm is usually too 
small to meet its capital need (Chen and Yuan, 2004). To enhance the capital-raising 
for firms during IPO as well as their subsequent rights offerings, Chinese local 
governments compete to lend fiscal support to their local IPO firms or SEO firms in 
attracting investment that is essential in promotion of territorial economic growth.  
There are three avenues for local government to lend fiscal support to firms 
within its jurisdiction: preferential tax rate, tax refund and financial subsidy. 
Nevertheless, since the policy of first levying and then rebating taxes (“first levy last 
refund”) was abolished in 2002, there had been two avenues left --- preferential tax 
rate and financial subsidy for local governments to mitigate the tax burden of 
companies in their administrative region prior to 2008.  
Preferential tax rate policy usually serves as tax incentives for firms and aims at 
encouraging the development of certain industries such as high-tech, energy, 
transportation, infrastructures and agriculture and so forth to contribute to the 
national industrial adjustment to an optimal structure. Preferential tax rate practice 
mainly focuses on those fast-developed economic and technologic regions as well as 
revolutionary regions, minority administrative regions, rural regions and national 
designated necessitous regions. The firms which are entitled to enjoy the favor are 
required to pay tax with the rate lower than the standard tax rate of 33%, usually 27% 
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and 18%, or even 0%, based on their firm attributes. The discretion of examining and 
approving tax preference for companies rests on the local tax bureau or local office 
of SAT (State Administration of Taxation) which is an indispensable affiliated 
segment of local government. At present, many Chinese local governments illegally 
grant tax rate favor to the companies3 that fail to meet the national criteria (refer to 
appendix 1) for the granting of preferential tax rate (Chen and Lee, 2001). As such, 
many Chinese companies, to varied extent, manage to enjoy the benefit from direct 
tax rate reduction policy. Most listed companies in China are subject to the standard 
tax rate of 30% plus 3% local tax prior to the listing. No sooner would those 
companies be listed, did they get the approval from local governments to enjoy a 
preferential tax rate. The ensuing lower tax burden results in higher level of reported 
earnings for the firms, which well facilitates their financing through the subsequent 
offerings. In addition, the levy of 3% local tax is directly at the local governments’ 
discretion. In order to attract providers of capital and technology, the local 
governments generally waive the 3% local tax in spite of the reduction of tax revenue 
for the local governments. Therefore, the effective tax burdens of most Chinese listed 
companies are mainly embodied within the three income tax rate intervals as follows: 
15%-18%, 24%-27% and 30%-33% (besides preferential tax rate of 0%). 
Before 1 January 2002, local governments could firstly levy the listed companies 
at an income tax rate of 33% and then refunded part of the taxes (usually 18%) to 
those companies. The specific amount of refund as well as which companies will be 
“qualified” for refund are up to the discretion of local governments which, in 
competition with each other for the flow of capital, offer large tax refund to attract 
                                                        
3 Prior to the promulgation of the new “Enterprise Income Tax Law of PRC” in March 2007, there were two 
distinctive sets of enterprise income tax law for domestic enterprises and for foreign & foreign investment 
enterprises (FIEs) respectively. The tax law for the FIEs stipulates more tax preference treatments than that for 
the domestic enterprises, enabling the local governments to attract more foreign investment to their jurisdictions. 
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investment (Wu et al., 2007). When the local government find it very hard to get 
favorable ground to grant preferential tax rate, they will resort to “first tax last 
refund” practice to relieve the substantial tax burden of the listed companies. In 
China, prior to the abolishment of “first tax last refund” policy, some local 
governments even refund the tax paid to those listed companies right during the IPO 
to help raise more capital and boost the stock price (Chen and Lee, 2001).  
Financial subsidy is another effective financial tool for local governments to lend 
support to firms within its jurisdiction. Similarly, in order to attract economic 
resources and promote regional economic development, local governments, to a 
certain extent, render financial subsidy to local competitive enterprises since they 
make up main forces of gearing up the territorial economy4. This phenomenon exists 
widely in China. If the attribute of subsidy received is accredited to the scope 
designated by the Chinese central government, the subsidy from local government 
can be exempt from income tax. Without the subsidies which are recognized as the 
revenue in the income statements, a certain number of SEO firms in China would 
have failed to beat the regulatory return on equity (ROE) requirement for the rights 
issues (Chen and Lee, 2001). 
In China, under the State Council regulations governing the tax revenue-sharing 
system, enterprise income tax levied from most of domestic enterprises and FIEs by 
the local offices of SAT (State Administration of Taxation) is shared between the 
central government and local governments in the portion of 6:45  (Liu, 2006). 
                                                        
4 The maintenance of territorial economic predominance and the development of economy depend on the 
investment and operations of firms within the jurisdictions. In this wise, local governments compete to afford 
local firms subsidies in support of their investment and operation. Given the varied territorial economic condition 
(such as industrial composition, economic resource, human capital, development of market economy, industrial 
predominance and so forth), the specific schemes of fiscal support to local firms differ accordingly among the 
local governments at provincial level. For instance, local government in Liaoning province, in view of automobile 
being the mainstay of the territorial economic development, granted the financial subsidy amounting to 100 
million RMB for Songliao Automative Corporation, a listed company in Liaoning province in support of its 
automotive production in December 2003.  
5 Prior to 2002, the income tax levied from local enterprises (excluding local financial institutions whose liable 
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Companies which pay the income tax ascribed to the above tax-revenue-sharing 
system are usually eligible for various sorts of tax favors, and local governments are 
entitled to grant tax favor to these firms. While 60% of the income tax6 levied by 
local offices of SAT from these companies is assigned as fiscal revenue to the central 
government, local governments just suffer from 40% direct loss of fiscal revenue 
accredited to the tax reductions from the enterprises that are granted the tax favor. 
Similar to granting preferential tax rate to listed firms, local governments also suffer 
just partial losses of the fiscal revenue if they provide “first levy last refund” to those 
listed companies.  
   In contrast to granting preferential tax treatment to companies, rendering fiscal 
subsidy to listed companies apparently is more costly for local governments, which 
does not limit to the fiscal expenditure of the local governments. Underlying 
opportunity cost also arises as economic resource for a local government is 
invariably limited for a certain period. If capital was excessively used as fiscal 
stipend for listed companies, the local government would be devoid of other social 
benefits brought about by alternatively utilizing its fiscal capital in other areas such 
as infrastructure, social welfare, education, medical treatment and environment etc. 
In addition, administration of the income tax levying and collection, capital turnover 
in the conversion of the levied tax into local fiscal revenue as well as in the 
subsequent disbursement of subsidy to firms engender costs to local governments too. 
However, fiscal support in the form of preferential tax favor will save those costs and 
the trouble for the local governments.  
In China, the number of enterprises that enjoyed tax favor from local government 
                                                                                                                                                             
income belongs to tax revenues of central government) is ascribed to the tax revenues of local governments. In 
2002, it is demanded that local governments surrender 50% of their corporate income tax revenues to central 
government. Later in 2003, the percentage of corporate tax revenue shared by the central government increased 
from 50% to 60%.  
6 It excludes the 3% local income tax levied by the local governments. Just as the disbursement of subsidy income, 
the waiver of the 3% income tax will induce direct fiscal loss of the local governments.  
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is significantly larger than the number of enterprises which enjoy financial subsidy 
(Chen and Lee, 2001)7. Compared to the subsidy offerings, the grant of preferential 
tax rate is a more common avenue for local governments to boost the income of the 
companies in their region, which might be due to preferential tax treatment being less 
costly to the local governments.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 
In addition, all the three avenues of the fiscal supports that embody the political 
incentives of a local government (refer to figure 1) will bring them disadvantageous 
factors for the region’s market economy. To be specific, competitiveness of the 
companies which do not have any form of fiscal subsidy or tax preference will be 
unfairly undermined at the industrial level in the same region. Consequently, 
companies probably focus more on how to maintain a desirable connection with 
officials of local governments to grasp fiscal support than on their self-subsistence 
and development.  
 
2.2. Earnings management in the Chinese listed companies 
Prior research literature argues that in order to sell the shares at a higher price and 
to raise capital at a lower cost, firms generally have a great desire of manipulating 
earnings during the equity offerings since investors rely on earnings more than any 
other measures of firm performance such as dividends, cash flows, or variants of 
earnings and the like (Biddle et al., 1995; Liu and Lu, 2002; Francis et al., 2003). 
                                                        
7 Chen and Lee (2001) state that less than 5% of Chinese listed firms during 1997-1999 are liable for the standard 
income tax rate of 33%. Chinese listed firms which enjoy financial subsidy from local governments account for 
20.19% in 1997, 49.41% in 1998 and 54.66% in 1999 respectively among the listed firms.  
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Survey results also indicate that managers view earnings as the key metric for 
performance evaluations by investors and analysts (Graham et al., 2005). As 
investors rely exceedingly on reported earnings to evaluate firm performance, firms 
are apt to manipulate earnings through accruals (Teoh et al., 1998a) and the abnormal 
accounting accruals are unusually high around the equity offerings (Teoh et al., 
1998c; Ducharme et al., 2004).  
The agency conflict between controlling shareholders and external investors 
accounts for a significant portion of earnings management in China’s listed firms 
(Jian and Wong, 2004). The controlling shareholders are prone to plunder the wealth 
of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 
2003), and manage earnings to mask their true firm performance and to conceal their 
private control benefits from the public (Leuz et al., 2003; Haw et al., 2004). They 
are particularly susceptible to engaging in earnings management in the setting of 
equity offerings (Jian and Wong, 2004).  
In China, listed companies must meet certain return on equity (ROE) criteria to 
be qualified for rights issues8. So the controlling shareholders have great desire to 
exalt earnings above the ROE benchmark. Aharony et al. (2000) provide the 
evidence of earnings manipulations and the high median ROE prior to the IPO for 
listed Chinese firms. Chen and Yuan (2004) and Haw et al. (2005) both find that the 
Chinese listed firms manipulate earnings to meet the ROE requirements for rights 
issues. Meanwhile, the earnings exaltation enables the listed firms to gain trust from 
regulators and the public, and this in turn enhances the efficiency of capital-raising. 
                                                        
8 From 1996 to 1998, one of the basic requirements was that companies had to have a minimum of 10% ROE for 
the three consecutive years prior to the seasoned equity offerings (CSRC, China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, Notice No.17, 1996). In 1999, the rule was modified to requiring an average ROE of at least 10% as 
well as a minimum 6% in each of the 3 years prior to the offerings (CSRC Notice No.12, 1999). From 2001 
onwards, CSRC relax the restriction of an average ROE of at least 10% and just a minimum 6% ROE is required 
of the listed firms to qualify for the right offerings (CSRC Notice No.43, 2001). Meanwhile, three consecutive 
profitable years are required of Chinese listed firms to qualify for initial public offerings.  
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Besides, most of the controlling shareholders prone to manipulate the earnings to a 
high level so that they would be subject to less supervision or restriction upon any of 
their misbehaviors e.g. the tunneling9.     
 
2.3. The impact of fiscal supports from local governments on earnings 
management  
It is well documented in the prior literature (e.g. Rangan, 1998; Loughran and 
Ritter, 1997; Teoh et al., 1998a; Jegadeesh, 2000) that pre-issue earnings 
management through discretionary accruals explains the long-term 
underperformance of the firms after equity offerings. Earnings management by listed 
companies through accruals is just like the borrowing of the future earnings and thus 
subsequent earnings would decline10 (Aharony et al., 2000). Or rather, the listed 
companies boost their current financial performance at the expense of future reported 
financial status. In contrast, earnings management in the form of fiscal support, 
which is ascribed to the behavior of the local government rather than that of 
individual companies or integral group companies11, is free from temporary transfer 
of earnings through “time”. The afforded fiscal support from local governments adds 
substantial economic value to the listed companies without sacrifice of their future 
reported financial performance. In this respect, earnings derived from fiscal support, 
which are easily identified and disclosed in the financial statements, will not mislead 
the investors as earnings manipulated by firms, and hence is more credible to the 
                                                        
9 Johnson et al. (2000) use “tunneling” to describe the diversion of resource away from firms for the private 
benefits of the controlling shareholders. Tunneling includes activities such as outright theft, loan guarantees, 
related party loans and related party sales of assets or products below the market price.  
10 Loughran et al. (1997) show that seasoned offerings are followed by significant earnings declines. Teoh et al. 
(1998a) find that post-issue stock return underperformance of issuers is accompanied by unusually poor earnings 
performance. Teoh et al. (1998c) also find that discretionary accruals are unexpectedly high around the IPO year 
and decline with net income afterwards.  
11 Integral group companies encompass subsidiary companies, parent companies and their affiliated/related 
parties. 
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market.  
In the setting of equity offerings, earnings manipulation through accruals is 
usually not the optimal action as regards a firm’s investing and operating strategies12. 
The purpose that the firm’s actions serve is no more than to meet the qualification of 
rights offerings or stock price lift to cut down their financing costs. Dechow et al. 
(1996) show that finance at low cost forms a dominant motivation for the earnings 
manipulations by firms, and find that while unidentified earnings manipulators enjoy 
lower costs of capital, identification as an earnings manipulator is associated with 
substantial increases in the cost of capital. Shivakumar (2000) provides evidence that 
investors rationally infer this earnings management at the equity offerings 
announcements and, as a result, reduce their price response to unexpected earnings 
released right after offering announcement and that investors would also correct the 
price impact of earlier earnings manipulations at the offering announcement. As Haw 
et al. (2005) find, in China, investors are able, to some extent, to “see through” the 
quality of managed earnings and rationally adjust for it for their investment decisions 
in the year of rights offering. In this vein, once the firms’ earnings management 
behaviors are seen through by outsiders, the listed companies will suffer from price 
discount by external investors and bear much reputation loss, directly resulting in 
much dent on their capability of raising capital in the equity issues.  
In addition, since Ritter’s (1991) influential study, many papers document that 
firms underperform relative to benchmark indices (e.g. ROE) or to the similar stocks 
following their equity offerings13. Even if some investors might fail to recognize 
                                                        
12 For example, firms can advance recognition of revenues by excessively selling their products through credit 
sales and delay recognition of expense by classifying more manufacturing overhead costs to be inventorial costs 
rather than period costs. Still, the resultant ensuing report of low level of accounting income may violate debt 
covenant restrictions.   
13 Though the IPO underperformance effect is widely accepted, Gompers and Lerner (2003) propose a small 
sample explanation to the IPO underperformance puzzle. Nevertheless, a recent paper by Ang et al. (2007) 
presents new compelling evidence supporting the existence of the IPO underperformance effect by disproving 
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earnings manipulated by issuers around the offerings, they still would correct their 
misevaluations caused by earlier earnings management and lower the stock price in 
the long-term post-offering period. Teoh et al. (1998b) find that issuers with unusual 
high accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock return performance three years 
thereafter. Teoh et al. (1998a) and Rangan (1998) find that rights issuers who adjust 
discretionary accruals to report higher net income prior to the offerings have lower 
post-issue long-run abnormal stock return. Denis and Sarin (2001) also find that 
annual earnings announcements in long-run post-SEO period are met with a 
significantly negative abnormal stock price reaction. In this wise, the subsequent 
poor market performance would severely undermine firms’ capability to re-finance 
capital through yet another seasoned rights issuing afterwards, while a rights offering 
is argued to be the dominant source of financing for listed firms in China (Haw et al., 
2005)14.  
As suggested previously, different from earnings manipulated by the 
management, earnings ascribed to fiscal supports by the local governments are much 
credible and informative to the public. Therefore, fiscally supported by the local 
governments in boosting the reported earnings, the firms would have less motivation 
to venture upon the earnings manipulations. The discussion above leads to the 
hypothesis respectively as follows: 
H1: The firms will be less likely to manipulate earnings if they enjoy more financial 
subsidy from the local government. 
H2: The firms will be less likely to manipulate earnings if they enjoy more income 
tax expense savings attributed to the preferential tax favor from the local 
                                                                                                                                                             
Gompers and Lerner’s (2003) argument that the underperformance may be attributed to a small sample effect or 
“Peso problem”.  
14 Haw et al. (2005) document that China’s regulators seldom approve listed companies’ requests to issue bonds 
and that the listed Chinese firms are strongly motivated to maintain the ability to obtain long-term financing 
through equity offerings. 
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government. 
The fiscal support is segregated into the categories of preferential tax favor and 
financial subsidy in the above hypothesis in view of their distinctive attributes. First, 
as indicated previously, the grant of preferential tax favor is less costly to local 
governments than the subsidy offerings. Second, once preferential tax favor is 
granted to the firms, it can rarely change across the subsequent fiscal years. In 
contrast, the scheme of the subsidy grant in support of financing for SEOs or IPOs 
can vary subsequently in the light of firms’ earnings performance across fiscal years. 
Compared to preferential tax favor, financial subsidy is a more flexible tool for local 
governments to help boost the reported earnings of IPOs and SEOs across periods.  
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3 Research Design 
3.1. Sample selection 
Panel A of Table 1 describes the sample selection processes. My sample selection 
starts with the entire population of both IPO firms and SEO firms on the Shenzhen 
and Shanghai stock exchanges for 1997-200615 based on both the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and Wind database. With 
reference to the sample selection method proposed by (Rangan, 1998), if listed 
companies have equity offerings more than once within any three years during the 
test period, I only choose the earliest equity offering as my selection target so as to 
trim measurement errors resulting from iterative offerings. Financial institutions are 
removed since the financial variables used in their earnings management measures 
are not comparable to those used by non-financial firms16. I further truncate firms 
whose listing had been postponed as well as those that lack the industry information 
from the database. The final sample consists of 3292 firm-year observations for the 
selected firms with complete financial accounting information during the three years 
prior to the year of equity offerings. Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the distribution 
of those final sample firm-years across fiscal years and industries17.  
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
                                                        
15 Noted that 2007 is not included in the sample period for the reason that firms which would lose their previous 
tax preference assigned to the prior tax act (especially foreign investment enterprises) will have great incentives 
to manage earning upwards to take advantage of lower tax rate that is still available before the new tax act is duly 
enforced in 1 January 2008. This will cause severe confounding effect to my results if firms in 2007 are included. 
This fact proposed measures up to the prior research findings that firms manipulate earnings upwards for the 
years before tax-rate increases due to the tax-incentive scheme (Lin, 2006). Expectedly, SOEs (State-owned 
enterprise) that bear highest level of income tax rate (33%) ex ant the enforcement of new Enterprise Income Tax 
Law are inclined to manage earnings downwards through accruals prior to the end of 2007. In this way, the SOEs 
will reduce income tax expenditure by reserving more earnings to be recognized after the year of 2008 during 
which they enjoy lower level of income tax rate (25%) under the new income tax law.  
16 Specifically, the nature of accruals, the capital structure and the characteristic of the operating cash flow of the 
financial firms differ greatly from those of non-financial firms. 
17 I use the industry definition system created by the CSRC, which classifies firms into 13 major industries such 
as manufacturing, real estate, commercial, etc. 
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3.2. Measurement of variables 
3.2.1. Earnings management  
As for earnings management behavior, using (discretionary) accruals is fairly 
flexible, and is more difficult for investors as well as regulators to identify than using 
the “below-the-line items” (items from non-operating income). External auditors 
bear much greater risk to tolerate earnings manipulation through the easily 
identifiable below-the-line items. Moreover, outside investors are mainly concerned 
over operating income that most accruals stem from instead of the below-the-line 
income when evaluating the financial performance of listed companies. In China, 
companies who report higher operating income but lower income from 
below-the-line items18 have a greater chance of obtaining government approval for 
rights offerings (Haw et al., 2005). Therefore, this study designates discretionary 
accruals as the measure of earnings management by listed companies prior to the 
equity issues. 
   I use the cross-sectional version19 of the modified-Jones model (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Becker et al., 1998; Bartov et al., 2000). Under this model, the 
level of discretionary accruals for a particular firm is calculated as the difference 
between the firm’s total accruals and its non-discretionary accruals (NDA), as 
estimated with Equation (1):  
)/(ˆ]/)[(ˆ)/1(ˆˆ/ 1,,31,,,21,101,, −−−− +Δ−Δ++= titititititititi APPEARECREVAANDA αααα           (1) 
                                                        
18 Chen and Yuan (2004) show that China’s regulators increase their scrutiny of the use of excessive amounts of 
non-operating income to manage earnings when approving rights issue application. 
19 A cross-sectional accruals model is adopted for two reasons. First, a time-series version of the model requires a 
strong stationarity assumption in the parameters of the relation between nondiscretionary accruals and accruals 
drivers, and a contradiction of this assumption results in increased measurement errors in discretionary accruals. 
In China’s capital market, duration of the firms’ listing is short (less than 20 years hitherto, which fails to fulfill 
the minimum requirement of test period by time-series model). In addition, main business of Chinese listed firms, 
accounting rules and policies for Chinese listed companies change since IPO and thus lack a relatively stationary 
and sufficient time series. Second, as has been shown in prior literature (Subramanyam, 1996; Bartov et al. 2000), 
a cross-sectional model appears to be more efficient than a time-series model in capturing the extent of accrual 
manipulations. 
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Where 1αˆ , 2αˆ and 3αˆ are coefficients 20  estimated during the test period of 
1994-2005 from the following cross-sectional regression21: 
titititititititi APPEAREVAATA ,1,,31,,21,101,, )/()/()/1(ˆ/ εαααα ++Δ++= −−−−                    (2) 
Where = Total accruals for firm i in year ttiTA ,
22, 
   = Change in revenue for firm i between year t − 1 and t, tiREV ,Δ
tiPPE , = Gross property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t, 
     = Total assets for firm i at the end of the previous year, 1, −tiA
  = the change in receivables for firm i between year t −1and t. tiREC ,Δ
The model assumes that no systematic earnings management occurred for the 
cross-sectional estimation sample. So I exclude the IPO and SEO firm-years when 
running the cross-sectional estimates with equation (2). My estimation of the 
parameters of modified-Jones model includes a constant term 0αˆ since doing so 
serves to mitigate the model misspecification (Kothari et al., 2005)23 . Having 
estimated non-discretionary accruals (NDA) from equation (1) above, the amount of 
discretionary accruals (DA) for firm i in year t are calculated as the residual value 
                                                        
20 I relax the within industry restriction on Modified Jones Model estimation for two reasons. Firstly, a potential 
defect of industry control is the under-estimation of discretionary accruals and over-estimation of 
non-discretionary accruals (McNichols, 2000; Haw et al., 2004). Bagnoli and Watts (2000) show that the 
inclination of earnings management increases because of the firms’ reliance on the relative performance 
evaluation by the time firms expect competitors to manage earnings. In this scenario, an industry specific model 
may overstate (understate) the extent of non-discretionary (discretionary) accruals because industry controls may 
encompass the average level of discretion exercised by the industry (McNichols, 2000; Kothari et al., 2005). 
Secondly, there is lack of sufficient data for the estimation sample that excludes IPOs and SEOs, which lowers 
the power of the test. Few industry-years in industry cross-sections manage to attain at least 20 estimation 
firm-years after excluding the IPOs and SEOs except for the manufacture industry-years.   
21 The adjustment for changes in receivables (i.e. modified-Jones model) is only applied to equation (1) to allow 
for the possibility of credit sales manipulations by the equity issuers. With respect to coefficient estimates in the 
accruals expectation model (equation (2)), the original Jones model is used (Dechow et al., 1995; Bartov et al., 
2000). All variables in the model are scaled by lagged assets to reduce heteroscedasticity, as it is assumed that 
lagged assets are positively associated with the variance of the disturbance term (Jones, 1991).  
22 For post-1998 data, TA is directly computed as the difference between operating net income and operating 
cash flows. For other years when cash flow statement data are not available, I compute total accruals as: TA= 
(change in current assets – change in cash – change in short-term lending) – (change in current liability – change 
in short-term borrowing – change in accrued income taxes – change in current portion of long-term debt) – 
depreciation expense – amortization expense, where the change is computed between year t and t-1. 
23 Kothari et al. (2005) indicate that inclusion of the intercept not only provides an additional control for 
heteroskedasticity not alleviated by using assets as the deflator but also mitigates problems stemming from an 
omitted size variable, and find that discretionary accrual measures based on Modified-Jones models without a 
constant term are less symmetric. 
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from equation (3): 
tititi NDATADA ,,, −=                                                   (3) 
Prior studies (e.g. Chen and Yuan, 2004; Haw et al., 2005) find that the Chinese 
equity issuers’ earnings management behavior is bound up with the regulatory ROE 
benchmark for the rights offerings. The multiyear requirement of rights offerings is 
likely to strengthen incentives for firms to manage earnings downward in years when 
ROE easily clears the benchmark hurdle (Clinch, 2005). In the meantime, downward 
earnings management prior to equity offerings might also result from the listed 
firms’ incentives of income smoothing since prior research implies that investors in 
civil-law countries probably put much weight over persistence and smoothness in 
judging the value relevance of the earnings (e.g. Ball et al., 2000). In this regard, I 
apply unsigned abnormal accruals as a proxy for earnings management24 which 
captures the firms’ proclivity to both overstate and understate the reported income 
prior to the equity issues.  
3.2.2. Fiscal supports variables 
As indicated previously, preferential tax rate or income tax refund as tax 
incentive to firms possesses the distinctive attributes different from financial 
subsidies in that subsidy offering is more flexible for local governments to help boost 
the reported earnings of the firms though more costly compared to the tax favor. So I 
add up both the income tax savings from tax rate favor and those from tax refund to 
serve as a separate fiscal support variable in my main model. The income tax savings 
from the tax favor (preferential tax rate and tax refund) is measured as having 33% 
                                                        
24The use of unsigned discretionary accruals is important since it avoids the conceptual ambiguity associated with 
benchmark measures which essentially account for all firms that meet or beat certain thresholds to have low 
“quality” earnings (Kinney and Libby, 2002; Haw et al, 2004). Furthermore, more and more influential studies of 
earnings management also employ absolute value of discretionary accruals as a proxy for insider reporting 
discretion (e.g. Warfield et al., 1995; Klein, 2002; Frankel et al., 2002; Haw et al., 2004; Francis et al., 2005; 
Kwon et al., 2007). 
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(the standard tax rate) of pre-tax income subtracted by income tax expense plus 
income tax refund. The income tax expense and the income tax refund can be 
respectively obtained from the account of “income tax expense” and that of “income 
tax refund” in a firm’s income statement. Pre-tax income rather than the taxable 
income is employed in this study to measure a firm’s income tax savings attributed to 
preferential tax favor since using taxable income to calculate the standard tax burden 
at a tax rate of 33% will under-state or over-state the income tax savings attributed to 
preferential tax favor25. The amount of the income tax savings is deflated by net 
income as the income tax savings rate (TAXSAV/NI) to reflect the extent to which 
the income tax savings count in boosting firms’ reported earnings. 
The amount of financial subsidy received by the listed companies from the local 
government is derived from the account of “subsidy income” in a firm’s income 
statement. The subsidy rate (SI/NI), calculated as subsidy income divided by net 
income, is used to measure the extent to which the listed firms benefit from the 
financial subsidy in their earnings performance. 
 
3.3. Model specification 
The following pooled regression is conducted for the hypothesis test during the 
test period from 1994-200526
                                                        
25 Given the book-tax difference, in some cases, firms need to adjust the pre-tax income (upwards with 
non-tax-deductible expense and downwards with tax-exempt or tax-reduced income items) to taxable income in 
calculating the income tax payable. The stipulation of tax-exempt (e.g. the interest income from state bonds 
purchase) or tax-reduced (e.g. rental and royalties with 10% tax rate) income items by the enterprise income tax 
law serves as tax incentive to alleviate tax burden of firms and hence the tax-exempt or tax-reduced item is 
ascribed to a source of income tax savings attributed to preferential tax treatment for the firms. Meanwhile, the 
adjusted amount of non-tax-deductable expenses (expenses irrelevant to the income incurred and obtained by 
enterprises are non-tax-deductable according to the China’s enterprise income tax law) is not a source of income 
tax savings attributed to preferential tax favor.  
26 Since that profitability requirement of the qualification for equity offering as well as the mandatory public 
disclosure of fiscal financial performance is targeted at three consecutive years prior to the offering 
announcement, I designate three years prior to the issues as my target for each IPO firm or SEO firm from 
1997-2006, resulting in the substantial test period from 1994 to 2005 for the sample firm-years. 
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Where
ti
DA
,
= the unsigned Modified Jones-model discretionary accrual for firm i in 
year t; tiNI
SI
,)( = subsidy income divided by net income for firm i in year 
t; tiNI
TAXSAV
,)( = 33% of pre-tax income subtracted by income tax expense plus tax 
refund and deflated by net income for firm i in year t; = market value of 
common equity divided by the book value for firm i in year t; = natural 
logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t; = fixed assets divided by total 
assets for firm i in year t; = return on total assets for firm i in year t; 
tiMKT ,
tiSIZE ,
tiEXP ,
tiROA ,
ti
ROA
,
Δ = absolute value of change in return on total assets for firm i in year t. 
To appraise the aggregate effect of fiscal support from local government on the 
earnings management behavior of the firms that conduct the equity offerings, I use a 
variable of TFI, which is calculated as the sum of subsidy rate (SI/NI) and the tax 
savings rate (TAXSAV/NI), in place of the two aforementioned separate fiscal 
support variables and re-run the regression. 
Prior studies (e.g. Bagnoli and Watts, 2000) show that industry effect is important 
in explaining discretionary accruals. Aharony et al. (2000) find that Chinese listed 
firms’ incentives and opportunities for earnings management prior to the equity 
offerings vary across industries. Moreover, the fiscal support granted to listed firms 
is likely to be more homogeneous within industries than across industries27. So I 
applied robust standard errors clustered by industry to correct for the industry effect 
                                                        
27 Preferential tax favor in China is targeted at industry and region as is indicated in Section 2.1 and also can be 
inferred from the provisions of income tax law given in the appendix 1. As for the financial subsidy, it is offered 
to a larger extent to those firms in the protected industries such as petrochemicals, energy, and raw materials by 
China’s local governments.  
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(Rogers, 1993; Williams, 2000; Petersen, 2007). In addition, since that the incentive 
and scheme of fiscal supports vary among local governments at provincial level and 
also differ across fiscal years (Chen and Lee, 2001), I introduce the dummy variables 
in the regression to control for fixed effects of year and region28.  
In addition, I control for variables that prior studies have found to be associated 
with earnings management through accruals.  
Financial leverage (LEV), measured as the sum of short- and long-term debt 
divided by total assets, controls for income-increasing behavior to alleviate the 
constraints of accounting-based debt contracts29 (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Balsam et al., 2003) and captures the incentives to practice earnings management 
when close to debt covenant violations (Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Klein, 2002). 
Large firms likely face increased external monitoring, have more stable and 
predictable operations and stronger control structure30, and hence report smaller 
discretionary accruals (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Haw et al., 2004). So firm size 
(SIZE), measured as natural logarithm of total assets, is expected to be negatively 
associated with earnings management.  
Capital intensity of a firm (EXP), measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets, reflects the level of capital expenditure that can lower current assets as well as 
the accruals of a firm. Firms with more fixed assets will have less total accruals 
(Jones, 1991; Klein, 2002) and firms with higher total accruals are likely to have 
greater discretionary accruals (Becker et al., 1998; Krishnan 2003; Balsam et al., 
2003). Meanwhile, firms with more current assets are more capable of manipulating 
                                                        
28 The use of year dummies and region dummies also respectively account for the case that macroeconomic 
environment changes among calendar years and the case that earnings management may be directed by a 
provincial local government who essentially controls the firms within its jurisdictions and expects as high its 
offering price and as much capital intake to the region as possible (Chan et al., 2006) 
29 Leverage measures the extent of financial constraint of a firm’s indebtedness. Firms faced with financial 
constraint or distresses have strong motivation to boost the reported earnings so as to debase the financial costs. 
High leverage stimulates firms to manipulate earnings and firms with mandatory debt covenant probably have 
greater discretionary accruals (DeFond et al., 1994).  
30 Rajan et al. (1995) indicate that information asymmetries among insiders are lower for large firms.  
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earnings through working capital31. The higher ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
(EXP) generally implies smaller ratio of current assets to total assets. Therefore, 
while the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (EXP) is included as the control variable, 
I expect EXP to be negatively correlated to magnitude of earnings management.  
   Because discretionary accruals are large for rapidly growing firms or firms with 
high growth opportunities (McNichols, 2000; Haw et al., 2004; Kothari et al., 2005), 
the market-to-book-equity ratio (MKT) is included to control for the effect of 
earnings growth and growth opportunities on discretionary accruals32.  
The estimated discretionary accruals for IPOs and SEOs contain discretionary 
accruals correlated with earnings performance, in addition to accruals related to the 
equity offerings (Kasznik, 1999; Kothari et al., 2005). To alleviate the concern that 
the modified Jones model provides biased estimates of discretionary accruals when 
firms experience extreme earnings performance (Dechow et al., 1995), I employ 
regression-based approach33 to reduce measurement errors in the estimation of 
discretionary accruals. Two earning performance-related variables, (1) Return on 
total assets (ROA); (2) Absolute value of change in return on total assets (|∆ROA|), 
are introduced given that the level as well as change in earnings is positively 
associated with discretionary accruals (Kasznik, 1999; Klein, 2002; Haw et al., 2004). 
These measures also purge the earnings management measure of a firm’s inherent 
                                                        
31 Burgstahler et al. (1997) find that before the occurrence of earnings management, firms with more current 
assets and liabilities suffer less cost of manipulating earnings than those with less current assets and liabilities. 
32 An alternative proxy for earning growth expectations is analysts’ forecast of long-term earning growth 
(McNichols, 2000). Since the market for analysts agency is far from mature in China’s stock market, analysts 
forecast is not available for most of the Chinese listed companies. Therefore, due to the lack of data available, I 
dismiss the use of analysts’ forecast of long-term earning growth as the proxy. 
33 Kothari et al. (2005) argue that a performance-matched accrual measure mitigates type I errors. Nevertheless, I 
do not use the approach in the research setting of this study for the following two reasons: Firstly, there exists 
great value discrepancy between ROA of treatment firm-years and that of the matched firm-years with the closest 
ROA value from the same industry-years. So I am not able to form a meaningful performance-matched sample 
within industry-year due to limited sample size in my study. Secondly, the performance-matched approach’s 
superiority of addressing biased estimates of discretionary accruals of firms with extreme earnings performance 
lies in the assumption that, on average, the sample and matched firms have the same estimated non-event 
discretionary accruals and that, at the portfolio level, the impact of performance on accruals is identical for the 
test and matched control sample. However, the homogeneity in the relation between performance and accruals for 
the treatment firm and matched firm is not always warranted.  
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accruals, reversal of lagged-year accruals, and growth in earnings (Kasznik, 1999; 
Frankel et al., 2002; Klein, 2002; Haw et al., 2004).  
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4 Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
   Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the variables contained in the regression 
model. It is shown that the pooled sample average of unsigned discretionary accruals 
is 0.1298 which is well above zero. All the quartiles including the median are also 
well above zero. This implies that the equity issuers manage reported earnings by 
altering discretionary accounting accruals prior to the offerings, which is consistent 
with the prior research. The mean value of subsidy rate is 4.6% with a standard 
deviation of 19.8%, indicating that an average of 4.6% of net income of the pooled 
sample firm-years stems from the financial subsidy from the local governments. 
Likewise, the mean value of the income tax savings rate manifests that 
approximately an average of 17.5% of the earnings of the sample firm-years is 
derived from the enjoyment of tax favor. This suggests that preferential tax favor 
might generally be more significant in upgrading earnings performance than 
financial subsidy. Meanwhile, an average of aggregated 22.1% of the net income of 
the firm-years is ascribed to the fiscal support from the local governments. In 
addition, it can also be inferred from the quartiles that fiscal support in the form of 
preferential tax favor from local governments is more prevalent than that in the form 
of financial subsidy during the equity offerings in China. 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
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4.2. Regression results 
Table 3 reports Pearson and Spearman correlations among variables used in the 
model. The correlations are all below 0.50, suggesting that the model run with the 
sample firm-years are beyond the problem arising from multicollinearity.  
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
Table 4 presents the regression results for the main model. The coefficient of 
subsidy rate (SI/NI) is -0.027 with high significance level of 0.005 (two-tailed) while 
that of tax savings rate is -0.071 and statistically significance with p-value of 0.002 
(two-tailed). This conforms to the hypothesis that firms will be less likely to 
manipulate earnings if they enjoy more income tax savings attributed to the 
preferential tax favor or more financial subsidy from the local governments. The 
absolute value of the standardized coefficient (beta coefficient) of tax savings rate is 
far larger than that of the subsidy rate, signifying that preferential tax favor’s 
attenuating impact on the opportunistic earnings management is much stronger than 
that of financial subsidy. One explanation for this result is that compared to subsidy 
offering that varies across fiscal years, preferential tax treatment is a stable and 
long-run incentive to a firm, and thus makes the firm less motivated to manage 
earnings to window-dress its performance. The coefficient of the variable of 
aggregate fiscal support (TFI) is highly significant at p=0.001 (two-tailed) and also in 
expected sign, further corroborating that fiscal support from the local governments 
exerts negative impact on the earnings management behaviors of Chinese listed firms. 
Besides, consistent with prior studies, the control variables, LEV, MKT, SIZE, EXP, 
ROA and |∆ROA| are all statistically significant in both the regressions. All the 
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p-values in the regressions are based on the two-tailed test.  
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
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5 Sensitivity Analysis 
5.1. Alternative measure of earnings management  
The Modified Jones Model implicitly assumes that there is no earnings 
management through the recognition of revenue on credit sales for the 
cross-sectional estimation sample. In this wise, when discretion is exercised over 
revenues in non-SEO and non-IPO firms, not including the change in accounts 
receivable in estimation of non-discretionary accruals will result in biasing 
discretionary accruals toward zero. So I extend the Modified Jones abnormal 
accruals measure by adjusting the change in revenues with the change in receivables 
in the coefficient estimates of non-discretionary accruals. The pooled results, 
presented in Table 5, are similar in all respects to those reported in Table 4 for the 
main test.  
 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
5.2. Re-classification of fiscal support on basis of its cash flow-induced attribute 
Although the tax refund is complementary to preferential tax rate as tax incentive 
to firms, the tax refund provides firms with cash in addition to promoting the firms’ 
earnings performance. While preferential tax rate only serves to boost firms’ earnings 
without any cash flow induced, both subsidy and tax refund are revenue in form of 
cash flow recognized in the financial statements. They can improve firms’ short-term 
liquidity or long-term solvency which also conveys the positive information to the 
investors just as good earnings performance does. In this connection, I detach the tax 
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savings ascribed to tax refund from those ascribed to tax favor and combine tax 
refund rate with subsidy rate to form the separate fiscal support variable (FI_CASH) 
which is of cash-flow-induced attribute. The tax savings attributed to the grant of 
preferential tax rate (FI_NONCASH) is classified into non cash flow-induced 
category of fiscal support. The results are similar when I re-run the regression with 
these two re-classified fiscal support variables.  
The “first levy last refund” practice was abolished in 2002 in China and tax 
refund only accounts for a very small portion in my pooled sample firm-years34. To 
highlight the separate effect of financial subsidy and preferential tax rate on earnings 
management during the test period from 1994 to 2005, I further apply subsidy rate 
(SI_NI) and tax savings rate which is accredited to just preferential tax rate 
(FI_NONCASH) to re-run the regression, and as shown in Table 6, the exclusion of 
tax refund does not affect my main results. 
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
5.3. Segregation of IPOs and SEOs in the pooled sample firm-years 
It is well documented in existing literature that firms manipulate earnings before 
IPO and SEO. However, since the motivation for earnings management by IPO firms 
is likely to differ from incentives of SEO firms (Teoh et al., 1998a; Haw et al., 2005), 
I segregate the pooled sample into IPO firm-years and SEO firm-years and re-run the 
model. As shown in Table 7, the regression results with IPO firm-years and those 
with SEO firm-years both exhibit similar patterns as those with pooled firm-years in 
                                                        
34 Only 46 firm-years have tax refund from local governments during the test period, accounting for less than 2% 
of 3292 sample firm-years observations.  
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the main test, and (in test not reported in the table) are also robust using alternative 
measure of earnings management and re-classifying fiscal support variable as have 
been indicated in the two preceding sub-sections.  
 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
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6 Conclusion 
The study is the first to investigate whether fiscal supports from local 
governments have impact on earnings management. The empirical results, based on 
the sample firm-years from both IPOs and SEOs from 1997 to 2006, are all 
statistically significant in support of my hypothesis that the listed firms will be less 
likely to manipulate earnings prior to the equity issuing if they enjoy more financial 
subsidy or more income tax savings attributed to the preferential tax favor from the 
local government. The results are robust after using alternative measure of earnings 
management, segregating the pooled sample into IPOs and SEOs, and re-classifying 
fiscal support based on its cash flow induced attribute. The finding implies that 
institutional factors of fiscal supports from local governments should be taken into 
account in earnings management research over emerging capital market in which 
fiscal supports from local governments prevail and government’s influence on firm’s 
financial reporting incentives dominates35.  
Fiscal support from local governments, in some sense, avail the market efficiency 
of China’s stock market on account of its attenuating effects over the opportunistic 
earnings management as corroborated in the study. This has good implication for the 
impact of the enforcement of the latest Enterprise Income Tax Law on the China’s 
capital market. The new statute effective from January 1, 2008 abrogates original tax 
system that allows varied tax rates for firms of different properties, and legally 
stipulates the 25% enterprise income tax rate for all firms. The repeal of preferential 
tax favor (refer to appendix 2) makes a local government lose an impactful tool of 
lending fiscal support to the listed firms in increasing its ability (or rather, a region’s 
                                                        
35 For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue that the accounting choices are influenced by the expected 
political costs associated with given financial reporting outcomes. The political costs can be heightened tax 
burdens as well as a host of indirect tax such as heightened regulation or the threat of greater government 
intervention into firm’s business activities.  
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ability) to absorb capital in the stock market. In China, fiscal support in the form of 
preferential tax rate favor is more prevalent than that in the form of financial subsidy. 
Moreover, as found in Section 4, preferential tax favor is more significant in 
improving earnings performance and exerts greater constraint on earnings 
management than financial subsidy does during the equity offerings. In this regard, 
local governments have to resort to either providing their listed firms with more 
subsidy or reinforcing the prompt on the earnings management of the listed firms 
through their political influence so as to maintain the capability of raising capital 
within the jurisdiction in stock market. However, as indicated in Section 2.1, subsidy 
offering is more costly for a local government than the grant of preferential tax favor 
is. Capital resource for the local government to grant financial subsidy to listed 
companies is usually limited. So increasing subsidy disbursement in compensation of 
the lost preferential tax favor in support of listed firms would be circumscribed. 
Instead, to maintain the strength of absorbing investment from capital market, the 
opportunistic earnings management in “window-dressing” firm performance would 
probably be aggravated and more prevalent in the capital market. This would be yet 
another shortcoming of the new Enterprise Income Tax Law (besides the probable 
tamper with appeals to foreign investors due to the abrogation of tax preference to 
foreign & foreign investment enterprises) carried out in 2008. In that event, to 
improve legal institutions and contribute to effective corporate governance system 
will be more pressing for the Chinese government.  
This study also has important implication for investors. In recent years, China has 
been privatizing government owned firms through selling their state shares and 
listing in developed overseas market. Given the increased opportunities for investors 
to purchase shares in state-controlled enterprises in China’s capital market, investors 
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shall be cautious of earnings management behavior of Chinese firms after the 
enforcement of the new Enterprise Income Tax Law in 2008. In addition, 
understanding the impact of fiscal support that embodies the political incentives of 
the government on firms’ financial reporting practice is also important to the 
investors for their investment decision.  
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Appendix 1 
Provisions of tax preference stipulated by relevant China’s income tax law 
 
A. Provisional regulations of the People Republic of China on Enterprise Income 
Tax issued by the decree of the State Council No.137 of PRC on December 13, 1993 
 
Article 8 Preferential tax favor is available to the following taxpayers:  
(1) Enterprises that operate in autonomous regions and are in need of incentives 
shall be given tax reductions or exemption for a specified period, upon the approval 
of local governments; 
 
(2) Enterprises given tax reductions or exemptions under the laws, executive 
regulations and relevant rules of the State Council shall be granted such tax favor 
accordingly.  
 
(Certain tax reductions and exemptions are granted to the following enterprises: high-technology 
enterprises and enterprises engaged in tertiary industry (e.g. consultancy, tourism, catering trade, 
information technology, logistics, technical services, etc) designated by the relevant regulations 
of the State, enterprise that use wastes as their main production materials, enterprises involved in 
agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery and water conservancy, enterprises engaged in 
science, education, culture, propaganda, health and sports, enterprises engaged in environmental 
protection and resource utilization, enterprise located in revolutionary base areas, minority 
nationality areas, remote areas and poor areas approved by the State, enterprise in the industry 
encouraged by the State in the West China, the newly founded enterprises engaged in 
transportation, electrical power, water reservation, post service, telecommunications, enterprises 
which have suffered from serious natural disasters like wind, fire, water, earthquake, 
newly-organized service enterprises that provide social employment opportunities, enterprises 
engaged in processing, venture capital enterprises, State entities set up to absorb additional 
workers, factories and farms operated by schools under the educational administration 
departments, welfare production enterprises that belong to the civil administration departments, 
farming and forestry enterprises, township enterprises, countryside credit firms, non-profit 
medical institutions, disease control institutions, women and child care institutions, non-profit 
welfare institutions in service for the old, non-profit scientific and research institutions, etc. Local 
tax bureaus or local office of SAT shall, with reference to the actual territorial situations and 
practical necessity, formulate the specific scheme of tax reductions and exemptions according to 
the relevant income tax favor policies prescribed notice by the Ministry of Finance (MOF (the 
Ministry of Finance) & SAT Notice No.1, 1994). In addition, taxpayers with an annual taxable 
income less than RMB 30000 will be taxed at a reduced rate of 18% while those with an annual 
taxable income between RMB 30000 and 100000 will be taxed at 27% (MOF Notice No.9, 
1994).) 
 
B. Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China on enterprises with foreign 
investment and foreign enterprises passed at Fourth Session of the 7th NPC on April 
9, 1991 and promulgated by the President of PRC Decree No.45 on the same date 
  
Article 7 The income tax on foreign investment enterprises established in special 
economic zones, foreign enterprises which are engaged in production or business 
operations and have establishments or places in special economic zones, and foreign 
investment enterprises engaged in production and established in economic and 
technological development zones shall be levied at the reduced rate of 15%. 
The income tax on enterprises with foreign investment which are engaged in 
production and established in coastal economic open zones, special economic zones, 
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or in the old urban districts of cities in the economic and technological development 
zones shall be levied at the reduced rate of 24%. 
  The income tax on enterprises with foreign investment, which are engaged in 
energy, communications, harbor, wharf or other State-encouraged projects in coastal 
economic open zones, special economic zones, or in the old urban districts of cities 
in the economic and technological development zones as well as other regions 
designated by the State Council may be levied at the reduced rate of 15%.  
 
Article 8 Any foreign investment enterprise that is engaged in production and 
scheduled to operate for a period of not less than 10 years shall, from the year in 
which it begins to make profits, be exempted from income tax in the first and second 
year and allowed a 50% reduction from the third to fifth year. However, the 
exemption and reduction of income tax for enterprises with foreign investment 
engaged in the exploitation of resources such as petroleum, natural gas, rare metals 
and precious metals shall be regulated separately by the State Council. Enterprises 
with foreign investment which have actually had operations for less than 10 years 
shall repay the amount of income tax already exempted or reduced36. 
   The relevant regulations promulgated by the State Council before the 
enforcement of this law shall remain applicable after this law is put into practice37 as 
follows. Preferential treatment in form of exemption and reduction of income tax is 
offered both to enterprises engaged in energy, communications, harbor, wharf and 
other major projects of the production nature for the tax holiday longer than that 
specified in the preceding paragraph and to those engaged in major projects of a 
non-production nature.  
   The enterprises with foreign investment which are engaged in agriculture, 
forestry or animal husbandry as well as any other enterprises with foreign investment 
which are established in remote underdeveloped areas may, upon approval by the 
competent authorities over tax affairs under the State Council for the application filed 
by the enterprises, be allowed a 15% to 30% reduction of the income tax for 10 years 
following the expiration of the period for tax exemption or reduction prescribed in 
the two preceding paragraph.  
  
Article 9 The exemption and reduction of local income tax for any enterprise with 
foreign investment which operates in a State-encouraged industry or undertakes a 
project encouraged by the State shall, in accordance with the actual situation, be at 
the discretion of the local governments at province, autonomous region or 
municipality that is directly affiliated to the State.  
 
Article 10 Any foreign investor of a foreign investment enterprise who reinvests its 
profit obtained from the enterprise back in the enterprise by increasing registered 
capital, or uses the profit as capital invested in establishing other foreign investment 
enterprise to operate for a period of not less than 5 years shall, upon approval by the 
tax authorities for the application filed by the investor, be refunded 40% of the 
income tax that is ascribed to the amount of the reinvestment. (In assessing the 
refundable tax amount, the said foreign investor shall provide supporting documents 
                                                        
36 The enterprises with foreign investment in the middle and west of China as encouraged by the State, the tax 
may be reduced to 15% for 3 years at the expiration of the tax break as ruled in this provision. Out of those 
qualified, the tax rate may be reduced to 10% for the export-oriented enterprises satisfying the rules of the State 
(SAT Notice No 172, 1999). 
37 The additional investment of the enterprise with foreign investment may also enjoy the tax incentives of the 
two preceding paragraphs.  
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certifying the attributed year of the profit used in the reinvestment. In the case that no 
supporting document can be provided, the local tax authorities shall determine the 
year by appropriate methods.)  
 
C. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on enterprise income tax passed at the 
5th Session of the 10th NPC on March 16, 2007, and promulgated by the President of 
PRC Decree No.63 on the same date 
 
Article 4 The rate of enterprise income tax shall be 25%.  
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Appendix 2 
Repeals of main preferential tax favor under the new enterprise income tax law 
Former preferential tax treatments Previously available to: (Prior to 2008) 
Firms in special economic zones, economic and 
technological development zones and Shanghai 
Pudong New Area. 
15% preferential tax rate 
Foreign Investment Enterprises located in economic 
technological development zones. 
24% preferential tax rate Foreign Investment Enterprises which are engaged in 
production in coastal economic open cities or other 
economic development areas.  
“Two-year-exemption followed by 
three-year half tax deduction” (2+3 tax 
holiday) 
Foreign Investment Enterprises which are engaged in 
production 
50% tax rate reduction for an extended 
period of three years 
Technologically-advanced enterprises 
50% preferential tax reduction Export oriented Foreign Investment Enterprises 
Foreign investors Reinvestment refund 
Foreign invested China Holding Companies 
Refund on local portion of the 
enterprise income tax revenue or local 
income tax  
Local governments at province and  municipality that 
is directly affiliated to the State have the right to grant 
the local income tax exemption or local income tax 
reduction to encouraged Foreign Investment 
Enterprises  
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Table 1 Sample selection and composition 
Panel A: Sample selection procedure         n 
Total number of firms that conduct equity offerings from 1997 to 2006 1838 
 Less: firms with iterative right offering within three years during the test period 385 
 Less: financial institutions with rights offerings 18 
 Less: firms whose listing had been postponed 24 
 Less: firms that lack the industry information in the database 10 
Selected equity issuers 1401 
Sample firm-year observations three years prior to the equity offerings by the selected equity offerings firms 4203 
Exclude firm-years without complete financial accounting information 911 
Final sample firm-year observations  3292 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Sample Firm-year observations across fiscal years and industries  
Industry   1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1994-2005  
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2 9 13 7 14 12 4 7 9 8 4 3 92 (2.79%) 
Mining 0 2 5 5 6 4 2 4 6 4 4 4 46 (1.40%) 
Manufacture 65 233 313 233 216 195 149 139 141 121 79 67 1951(9.26%) 
Utilities 8 20 27 16 18 16 11 10 12 14 7 5 164 (4.98%) 
Construction 1 5 9 6 5 3 3 7 9 5 5 4 62 (1.88%) 
Transportation 5 17 23 13 20 17 13 13 10 8 6 7 152 (4.62%) 
Information technology 6 25 32 18 19 20 15 21 16 9 9 9 199 (6.04%) 
Wholesale and retail 16 45 50 32 21 17 10 10 9 8 4 4 226 (6.87%) 
Real estate  11 21 25 15 15 15 10 5 3 8 8 8 144 (4.37%) 
Social service 6 13 16 12 14 12 3 3 2 4 4 4 93 (2.83%) 
Communication and Literature 0 2 3 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 (0.30%) 
Conglomerate 10 29 33 23 14 11 10 7 4 4 4 4 153 (4.65%) 
Total 130 421 549 382 363 324 230 226 221 193 134 119 3292 (100%) 
% of population 3.95 12.79 16.68 11.6 11.03 9.84 6.99 6.87 6.71 5.86 4.07 3.61 100 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Sample description and variable definitions: The sample contains 3292 firm-year observations with 
complete financial information for the hypothesized test. |DA|, the unsigned abnormal accruals, is 
estimated through the cross-sectional Modified Jones Model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the 
coefficient estimates of nondiscretionary accruals. SI/NI refers to the subsidy rate, which is measured as 
subsidy income divided by net income. TAXSAV/NI refers to the income tax savings rate ascribed to both 
preferential tax rate favor and the tax refund favor, which is measured as having 33% of pre-tax income 
subtracted by income tax expense plus tax refund before deflated by the net income. TFI is computed as 
the sum of subsidy rate (SI/NI) and income tax savings rate (TAXSAV/NI). MKT equals the market value 
of common equity divided by the book value of the common equity. LEV equals the sum of short- and 
long-term debt divided by total asset. SIZE equals natural logarithm of total asset. EXP equals the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets. ROA equals return on total assets. |∆ROA| equals absolute value of change in 
net income divided by total assets.  
 
 
 
 
Variable  Mean 25% Median 75%  St.Dev 
|DA|  0.130 0.042 0.090 0.166  0.193 
TFI  0.221 0.154 0.216 0.296  0.232 
SI/NI  0.046 0 0 0.018  0.198 
TAXSAV/NI  0.175 0.010 0.212 0.252  0.128 
MKT  2.220 0 1.473 3.124  3.371 
LEV  0.516 0.412 0.533 0.642  0.155 
SIZE  8.789 8.467 8.716 9.042  0.465 
EXP  0.105 0 0 0.165  0.189 
ROA  0.092 0.054 0.080 0.114  0.061 
|∆ROA|  0.025 0.006 0.015 0.031  0.035 
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlations among variables used in the |DACC| regression in the upper (lower) triangle. 
 
 |DA|  SI/NI TAXSAV/NI MKT LEV SIZE EXP ROA |∆ROA| 
|DA| 1  -0.033* 0.003 0.003 0.010 -0.124*** -0.094*** 0.167*** 0.168*** 
SI/NI -0.058***  1 -0.029* 0.003 0.020 0.011 0.006 -0.074*** 0.006 
TAXSAV/NI 0.040**  0.023 1 0.105*** -0.179*** -0.059*** -0.210*** 0.151*** 0.121*** 
MKT -0.046***  0.046*** 0.100*** 1 -0.189*** 0.074** -0.037*** -0.057*** 0.023 
LEV 0  0.026 -0.176*** -0.347*** 1 0.116*** 0.070*** -0.277*** -0.105*** 
SIZE -0.179***  0.061*** -0.063*** 0.238*** 0.125*** 1 0.230*** -0.361*** -0.153*** 
EXP -0.107***  0.169*** -0.205*** 0.084*** 0.076*** 0.157*** 1 -0.147*** -0.116*** 
ROA 0.215***  -0.107*** 0.150*** -0.217*** -0.298*** -0.455*** -0.158*** 1 0.436*** 
|∆ROA| 0.199***  -0.047*** 0.124*** -0.070*** -0.027*** -0.164*** -0.143*** 0.348*** 1 
________________________ 
***, **, * indicate correlations significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively, two tailed, using Pearson (Spearman) correlation test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 
The impact of fiscal support on earnings management  
This table presents coefficients from various pooled, cross-sectional estimations of the following regression 
model: 
|DA| = α + β TFI (β1SI/NI+β2TAXSAV/NI) + γ1MKT+ γ2LEV+ γ3SIZE+ γ4EXP + γ5ROA+ γ6|∆ROA|+ (fixed 
effect) + ε 
 
Where |DA|, the unsigned abnormal accruals, is estimated through the cross-sectional Modified Jones Model 
with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the coefficient estimates of nondiscretionary accruals. SI/NI refers to the 
subsidy rate, which is measured as subsidy income divided by net income. TAXSAV/NI refers to the income 
tax savings rate ascribed to both preferential tax rate favor and the tax refund favor, which is measured as 
having 33% of pre-tax income subtracted by income tax expense plus tax refund before deflated by the net 
income. TFI is computed as the sum of subsidy rate (SI/NI) and income tax savings rate (TAXSAV/NI). MKT 
equals the market value of common equity divided by the book value of the common equity. LEV equals the 
sum of short- and long-term debt divided by total asset. SIZE equals natural logarithm of total asset. EXP 
equals the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. ROA equals return on total assets. |∆ROA| equals absolute value 
of change in ROA. The fixed effect of year and region are included as dummies in the regressions. For 
simplicity, they are not reported in the table.  
 
    Separate effect of Fiscal support Aggregate effect of fiscal support
Independent  
Variable 
 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 Coeff. t-stat. Sig. Coeff.  t-stat.  Sig. 
Constant    ?   0.293 5.13 0.000*** 0.286  4.94  0.000***
TFI  -     -0.038  -4.38  0.001***
SI/NI  -  -0.027 -3.55 0.005***      
TAXSAV/NI  -  -0.071 -4.03 0.002***      
MKT  +  0.002 2.29 0.043** 0.002  2.06  0.064* 
LEV  +  0.064 3.57 0.004*** 0.067  3.63  0.004***
SIZE  -  -0.022 -4.35 0.001*** -0.022  -4.29  0.001***
EXP  -  -0.073 -2.24 0.047** -0.072  -2.18  0.052* 
ROA  +  0.336 7.75 0.000*** 0.328  7.50  0.000***
|∆ROA|  +  0.649 7.64 0.000*** 0.646  7.69  0.000***
            
Adj R2 (%)       7.17 7.12 
n    3292 3292 
________________________ 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively, two tailed. 
The t-statistics is based on clustered standard error adjusted for correlations within industry. The standardized coefficients 
(beta coefficients) of SI/NI and TAXSAV/NI are -0.0277 and -0.0471 respectively.  
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TABLE 5 
Sensitivity test: Alternative measure of earnings management 
 
This table presents regressions results using alternative measure of earnings management.  
The alternative proxy for earnings management is the unsigned abnormal accruals estimated through the 
extended cross-sectional Modified Jones Model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the coefficient estimates of 
nondiscretionary accruals. The modified Jones abnormal accruals measure is extended through the inclusion 
of the change in accounts receivable in the estimation of non-discretionary accruals. SI/NI refers to the 
subsidy rate, which is measured as subsidy income divided by net income. TAXSAV/NI refers to the income 
tax savings rate ascribed to both preferential tax rate favor and the tax refund favor, which is measured as 
having 33% of pre-tax income subtracted by income tax expense plus tax refund before deflated by the net 
income. TFI is computed as the sum of subsidy rate (SI/NI) and income tax savings rate (TAXSAV/NI). MKT 
equals the market value of common equity divided by the book value of the common equity. LEV equals the 
sum of short- and long-term debt divided by total asset. SIZE equals natural logarithm of total asset. EXP 
equals the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. ROA equals return on total assets. |∆ROA| equals absolute value 
of change in ROA. The fixed effect of year and region are included as dummies in the regressions. For 
simplicity, they are not reported in the table.  
 
    Separate effect of Fiscal support Aggregate effect of fiscal support
Independent  
Variable 
 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 Coeff. t-stat. Sig. Coeff.  t-stat.  Sig. 
Constant    ?   0.298 5.37 0.000*** 0.290  5.15  0.000***
TFI  -     -0.041  -4.52  0.001***
SI/NI  -  -0.028 -3.53 0.005***      
TAXSAV/NI  -  -0.078 -4.25 0.001***      
MKT  +  0.002 2.46 0.032** 0.002  2.21  0.049** 
LEV  +  0.068 3.74 0.003*** 0.072  3.80  0.003***
SIZE  -  -0.023 -4.55 0.001*** -0.022  -4.48  0.001***
EXP  -  -0.072 -2.18 0.052* -0.071  -2.12  0.058* 
ROA  +  0.349 8.30 0.000*** 0.339  8.05  0.000***
|∆ROA|  +  0.649 7.28 0.000*** 0.645  7.35  0.000***
            
Adj R2 (%)       7.34 7.28 
n    3292 3292 
________________________ 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively, two tailed. 
The t-statistics is based on clustered standard error adjusted for correlations within industry. The standardized coefficients 
(beta coefficients) of SI/NI and TAXSAV/NI are -0.0287 and -0.0517 respectively.  
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TABLE 6 
Sensitivity test: Re-classification of fiscal support on basis of its cash flow-induced 
attribute 
 
This table presents regressions results using fiscal support variables re-classified on the basis of its cash 
flow-induced attribute.  
SI/NI refers to the subsidy rate, which is measured as subsidy income divided by net income. FI_CASH/NI 
refers to the sum of subsidy rate (SI/NI) and the income tax savings rate ascribed to the tax refund favor. 
FI_NONCASH is the income tax savings rate attributed to preferential tax rate, which is calculated as having 
33% of pre-tax income subtracted by income tax expense and deflated by net income. MKT equals the market 
value of common equity divided by the book value of the common equity. LEV equals the sum of short- and 
long-term debt divided by total asset. SIZE equals natural logarithm of total asset. EXP equals the ratio of fixed 
assets to total assets. ROA equals absolute value of ROA. |∆ROA| equals absolute value of change in ROA. The 
fixed effects of year and region are included as dummies in the regressions. For simplicity, they are not reported 
in the table.  
 
   Re-classification with tax refund Re-classification without tax refund 
Independent  
Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
 Coeff. t-stat. Sig. Coeff.  t-stat.  Sig. 
Constant   ?   0.295 5.30 0.000*** 0.296  5.35  0.000*** 
TFI -          
SI/NI -     -0.027  -3.56  0.004*** 
FI_CASH -  -0.027 -4.02 0.002***      
FI_NONCASH -  -0.072 -3.52 0.005*** -0.072  -3.49  0.005*** 
MKT +  0.002 2.28 0.044** 0.002  2.27  0.045** 
LEV +  0.064 3.60 0.004*** 0.064  3.60  0.004*** 
SIZE -  -0.022 -4.49 0.001*** -0.023  -4.54  0.001*** 
EXP -  -0.073 -2.23 0.047** -0.073  -2.23  0.048** 
ROA +  0.336 7.61 0.000*** 0.336  7.62  0.000*** 
|∆ROA| +  0.650 7.69 0.000*** 0.651  7.73  0.000*** 
           
Adj R2 (%)       7.18 7.18 
n   3292 3292 
________________________ 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively, two tailed. 
The t-statistics is based on clustered standard error adjusted for correlations within industry. The standardized coefficients 
(beta coefficients) of FI_CASH/NI and FI_NONCASH in the first regression are -0.0280 and -0.0474 respectively while 
those of SI/NI and FI_NONCASH in the second regression are -0.0277 and -0.0474 respectively.  
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TABLE 7 
Sensitivity test: Segregation of IPOs and SEOs in the pooled sample firm-year 
observations 
 
This table presents regressions results for SEO firm-years and IPO firm-years respectively. 
SI/NI refers to the subsidy rate, which is measured as subsidy income divided by net income. TAXSAV/NI 
refers to the income tax savings rate ascribed to both preferential tax rate favor and the tax refund favor, 
which is measured as having 33% of pre-tax income subtracted by income tax expense plus tax refund before 
deflated by the net income. TFI is computed as the sum of subsidy rate (SI/NI) and income tax savings rate 
(TAXSAV/NI). MKT equals the market value of common equity divided by the book value of the common 
equity. LEV equals the sum of short- and long-term debt divided by total asset. SIZE equals natural 
logarithm of total asset. EXP equals the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. ROA equals return on total assets. 
|∆ROA| equals absolute value of change in ROA. The fixed effect of year and region are included as 
dummies in the regressions. For simplicity, they are not reported in the table. 
 
 Panel A: Regression results with SEO firms 
    Separate effect of Fiscal support Aggregate effect of fiscal support
Independent  
Variable 
 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 Coeff. t-stat. Sig. Coeff.  t-stat.  Sig. 
Constant    ?   0.137 1.20 0.254 0.135  1.19  0.259 
TFI  -     -0.047  -5.18  0.000***
SI/NI  -  -0.029 -3.27 0.007***      
TAXSAV/NI  -  -0.100 -3.26 0.008***      
MKT  +  0.001 0.78 0.451 0.001  0.61  0.553 
LEV  +  0.060 2.22 0.048** 0.061  2.20  0.050** 
SIZE  -  -0.011 -1.04 0.332 -0.012  -1.11  0.290 
EXP  -  -0.072 -1.77 0.104 -0.076  -1.80  0.100* 
ROA  +  0.224 2.52 0.028** 0.207  2.21  0.049** 
|∆ROA|  +  0.920 6.75 0.000*** 0.920  6.86  0.000***
            
Adj R2 (%)       7.73 7.64 
n    1743 1743 
 
Panel B: Regression results with IPO firms 
    Separate effect of Fiscal support Aggregate effect of fiscal support
Independent  
Variable 
 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 Coeff. t-stat. Sig. Coeff.  t-stat.  Sig. 
Constant    ?   0.287 2.26 0.045** 0.283  2.27  0.045** 
TFI  -     -0.030  -2.93  0.014** 
SI/NI  -  -0.025 -2.17 0.053*      
TAXSAV/NI  -  -0.046 -3.02 0.012**      
MKT  +  0.003 2.47 0.031** 0.003  2.43  0.033** 
LEV  +  0.054 1.76 0.106 0.056  1.87  0.088* 
SIZE  -  -0.028 -2.18 0.051* -0.028  -2.18  0.052* 
EXP  -  -0.055 -1.58 0.142 -0.054  -1.55  0.148 
ROA  +  0.405 4.43 0.001*** 0.401  4.46  0.001***
|∆ROA|  +  0.449 3.94 0.002*** 0.445  3.85  0.003***
            
Adj R2 (%)       10.18 10.16 
n    1549 1549 
________________________ 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively, two tailed. 
The t-statistics is based on clustered standard error adjusted for correlations within industry. The standardized coefficients 
(beta coefficients) of SI/NI and TAXSAV/NI in Panel A are -0.0267 and -0.0557 respectively while those of SI/NI and 
TAXSAV/NI in Panel B are -0.0304 and -0.0376 respectively.  
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Figure 1 Fiscal support in the setting of equity offerings 
Local government: 
(1) Incentives: To attract investors in promotion of regional 
GDP growth through the IPO and SEO of the listed firms 
within its jurisdictions. 
(2) Capability: The grant of fiscal support is up to the 
discretions of local governments and no law or regulation 
restricts the grant of fiscal support by local governments 
prior to IPO or SEO.  
Preferential Tax favor 
(1) Preferential tax rate 
(2) Tax refund 
Financial subsidy
To boost reported earnings of SEOs 
and IPOs for financing:  
(1) Qualification of equity offerings 
(to beat regulatory ROE requirement) 
(2) Stock price lift to cut down their 
financing costs  
More prevalent
Less costly to local government
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